

WASHINGTON STAR

APR 17 1964

CPYRGHT

JOSEPH KRAFT

## Bay of Pigs: Darkness Remains

### New Book to Show Cuban Invasion Was Doomed From the Start

Three years to the day after the event, the Bay of Pigs invasion remains shrouded in darkness. But in the next few weeks that cloudy subject is going to be in for a thorough public airing—thanks to an authoritative new book to be published May 18—"The Bay of Pigs," written by Haynes Johnson with the cooperation of the members of the Cuban Brigade. Mr. Johnson is a reporter on The Star's staff.

The general thesis of the Johnson book is that the whole project was too poorly conceived and organized to offer any prospect of enduring political success no matter what fixes were made or not made in the operational scheme. In the course of the narrative virtually all the principal actors, and no small part of the chorus, are shown in poor light. Telling shafts are aimed at the Kennedy and Eisenhower administrations, at the Joint Chiefs who picked the invasion site, at American public opinion, and even, mirabile dictu, at prestigious sections of that last refuge of irresponsibility, the American press.

But if the blame is general, the center of the difficulty is undoubtedly the Central Intelligence Agency. On Mr. Johnson's showing, the CIA not only made policy with a vengeance. It did far worse. Its agents misled the President, and deliberately moved to defy his authority.

The most striking incident occurred during the training period after President Kennedy had reserved the right to call off the operation entirely.

At that point the chief American instructor told the leaders of the Cuban Brigade that they were to move ahead even if he, or other Americans, ordered them to desist. As the Cubans remember it, he said: "You come here and make some kind of a show, as if you were putting us, the advisers, in prison, and you go ahead with the program as we have talked about it, and we will give you the whole plan, even if we are your prisoners."

Another striking incident turned on an effort by President Kennedy to take the edge off possible failure. The basic plan called for invasion, popular uprisings, and a march on Havana. President Kennedy directed the CIA to prepare an alternative plan: if things went awry, the invaders were to disperse into the hills and set up as guerrillas. But the agency never told the Cubans about the plan for guerrilla operations. Neither did it tell the President that the bulk of the Cuban invaders had not been trained for guerrilla activities.

In these circumstances, the President's explicit order against direct American participation in the landing was a non-order. As it happened, an American gave the signal for the firing that brought down the first enemy plane. Americans were in the van of the first two parties to hit the beach. One of these Americans promised the Brigade leaders they would have covering support from American jet planes.

What is shocking in this record is not so much the will

to work against presidential direction. The whole history of covert operations teaches that the promoters normally become committed to the point of irresponsibility. What is more shocking is that this country was so poorly protected against the predictable irresponsibility of its black bag operators. And how much better is it protected today?

Experience may have taught something; still, if President Kennedy was green, none of the veterans to whom he turned for guidance flashed warning signals. As to supervision of the CIA by selected, senior, not to say doddering, members of the Congress, it counted in the past, and counts today, for nothing. For the trick is not to fence the operators around with watchmen: too often the watchmen become accomplices and advocates. The trick is to make it easy for the President to disown and dispose of the operators and their projects. They must be made dispensable. The less they engage and commit powerful forces inside the government, the better.

That formula applies pre-eminently to the CIA itself. Because of the size of its bureaucracy and budget, the high calibre of its personnel, and the importance of its evaluative function, the agency is bound to have an important voice in government. But that voice does not have to be a mouthpiece for the black bag operators. On the contrary, there is no good reason why the operators should not be segregated out of the agency, and lodged in a special unit—small, secret, and without the capacity to line up weighty segments of the bureaucracy.